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Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) document that excess returns on the stock market are
puzzlingly higher under Democratic presidential administrations. We examine whether dif-
ferences in economic fundamentals can account for this presidential puzzle. We ﬁnd that
the role for fundamentals crucially depends on how they are deﬁned. When fundamentals
are identiﬁed with per capita consumption growth, diﬀerences in consumption growth ac-
count for at most 2% of the diﬀerence in excess returns across the presidential cycle. When
fundamentals are identiﬁed with the consumption growth of luxury goods, as much as 45%
of the diﬀerence in excess returns can be accounted for by diﬀerences in fundamentals.
Other measures of macroeconomic economic performance indicate large diﬀerences in busi-
ness cycle experience over the presidential cycle. Hence, large diﬀerences in excess returns
coincide with large diﬀerences in economic fundamentals across the presidential cycle. We
also investigate whether the observed diﬀerence in fundamentals and stock returns over the
presidential cycle were anticipated over the period we study. We do this in two ways. First
we examine real-time data on expectations. Expectations data reveal little evidence in favor
of a systematic relationship between presidential party and expected fundamentals or stock
returns. Secondly, we examine the robustness of the observed diﬀerence in stock returns
and fundamentals to large, unpredictable macroeconomic shocks. Removing the inﬂuence
of the most severe depression years and major military conﬂicts results in a considerable
attenuation of the presidential puzzle. This ﬁnding supports the view that the diﬀerences
in both fundamentals and excess returns over the presidential cycle were unanticipated.1 Introduction
Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003), henceforth SCV, document that excess returns on the
stock market are considerably higher under Democratic presidential administrations. For
example, they ﬁnd that over the period 1927-1998 the excess return on the CRSP value-
weighted portfolio averaged 10.7% during Democratic presidencies and 1.7% over Repub-
lican administrations on an annualized basis. This diﬀerence is striking. In comparison,
the small stock premium, the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and last CRSP size-decile port-
folio, is roughly 2% on an annualized basis over the same period. Apart from the size of
the diﬀerential, the diﬀerence is robust across subsamples and diﬀerent asset classes. SCV
ﬁnd strong evidence of a Democratric return premium over three periods (1927-1998, 1927-
1962, 1963-1998) in the CRSP value-weighted, equally-weighted and size-decile portfolios.
Furthermore SCV subject their ﬁnding to a battery of robustness checks; including the
bootstrap as well as size correcting their test statistics to account for the possibility of data
mining and still ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of a Democratic return premium.
SCV examine a variety of explanations for the return diﬀerential to no avail. In par-
ticular, they examine whether Republican and Democratic administrations are correlated
with business cycle risks. Instead of weakening the evidence in favor of the Democratic
premium, they ﬁnd that controlling for business cycle risks only bolsters the case for a large
and statistically signiﬁcant premium. Additionally SCV examine the variance of excess
returns and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence across the presidential cycle. Based on these con-
siderations the authors conclude that there is no risk based explanation for the diﬀerence
in returns. Furthermore, they argue that the large diﬀerence in excess returns represents
a puzzle and reﬂects diﬀerences in unexpected rather than expected returns. Ultimately,
they “attribute the diﬀerence in realized returns to the stock market being systematically,
positively surprised by Democratic policies.”
In this paper we shed light on the presidential puzzle by examining the link between
1the diﬀerence in unexpected returns and unexpected diﬀerences in economic fundamentals
across the presidential cycle. We do this through the lens of consumption based asset pricing
models. Consumption based asset pricing models predict that periods of unexpectedly high
consumption growth should also be periods of unexpectedly high excess returns. In measur-
ing consumption, we draw on a recent literature which stresses the importance of recognizing
incomplete consumption insurance and limited stock market participation (Constantinides
(2002), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991)). In the presence of these market frictions, aggregate
consumption measures are inappropriate for testing the implications of asset pricing models.
Instead, consumption should be deﬁned relative to those households actually investing in
the stock market. Recent research has documented that measuring consumption in this way
results in a dramatic improvement in both the ﬁt and plausibility of consumption based
asset pricing models (A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2003), Brav, Constantinides and Geczy
(2002)).
Informed by these considerations, we examine the presidential puzzle using both per
capita consumption of nondurables and services data as well as data on the consumption
of luxury goods. The per capita data is the standard measure of consumption typically
employed in tests of asset pricing models (Hansen and Singleton (1982)). The luxury goods
data is new and comes from A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo’s (2003) study of luxury goods
and the equity premium. These data serve as a proxy for the consumption of wealthy
stockholders. We examine whether either source of consumption data is informative for the
presidential puzzle.
We ﬁnd that the explanatory power of consumption based models for the presidential
puzzle depends crucially on which source of consumption data is employed. Over the sample
period for which we have data on both aggregate and luxury consumption measures, the
growth in both consumption measures is higher under Democratic administrations. The
magnitude, however, is only important in the case of luxury consumption growth. Per capita
2consumption growth was marginally higher under Democratic presidencies while luxury
consumption growth more than doubled across the presidential cycle. This diﬀerence in
luxury consumption growth implies that a signiﬁcant portion of the presidential puzzle can
be attributed to diﬀerences in economic fundamentals across the presidential cycle. In the
case of the CRSP value-weighted portfolio, our estimates suggest that roughly 40% of the
diﬀerence in excess returns across the presidential cycle can be traced to the robust growth
in luxury consumption over Democratic administrations. A similar calculation using the
per capita consumption data suggests that only 2% of the diﬀerence in excess returns can
be attributed to diﬀerences in per capita consumption growth. These results are in line with
those of A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2003) who demonstrate that luxury consumption
betas explain the unconditional cross section of stock returns more eﬀectively than do
per capita consumption betas between 1961 and 1998. Our results suggest that luxury
consumption betas are informative in explaining the large diﬀerence in excess stock returns
across Democratic and Republican presidencies as well as the unconditional cross section
of returns.
While our results indicate that diﬀerences in luxury consumption are important for un-
derstanding the presidential puzzle, we are still left with the issue that Republican admin-
istrations appear to have forecasted poor fundamentals (i.e., luxury consumption growth).
This raises two important questions.
First, what is the source of the diﬀerence in fundamentals across Democratic and Re-
publican administrations? Are the changes in luxury consumption growth related to the
underlying state of the macroeconomy or is the correlation between excess returns and lux-
ury consumption spurious? We address this question by showing that diﬀerences in luxury
consumption growth across the presidential cycle are directly related to the business cycle.
Republican presidencies have been more prone to economic recessions since 1929. Luxury
consumption, unlike per capita consumption, responds strongly to changes in the business
3cycle. Hence, periods of depressed growth in luxury consumption signal a general malaise in
overall economic activity. In this way, luxury consumption growth provides a link between
stock returns and the state of the macroeconomy.
Secondly, our analysis interprets changes in fundamentals over the presidential cycle as
unanticipated. Given the size and apparent predictability of the disparity in fundamentals
over the presidential cycle, it is natural to question whether these changes were anticipated.
Moreover, if investors could have forecasted better economic times during Democratic ad-
ministrations one would counterfactually expect lower returns during these periods. We
address the predictability of fundamentals in two ways.
First, we directly examine data on expectations. We use survey forecast data from the
Livingston survey of professional forecasters to assess whether or not investors expected any
diﬀerence in excess returns or economic activity across the presidential cycle. In general, we
ﬁnd little support for the claim that either expected economic activity or expected returns
vary considerably across the political cycle. Second, we examine the robustness of the
presidential puzzle to the inclusion of two classes of economic shocks that are, arguably,
diﬃcult to anticipate: depressions and major military conﬂicts. We examine the diﬀerences
in excess returns and fundamentals after removing the major depression years (1929-35)
as well as all major military conﬂicts since 1929.1 Removing these periods from the data
results in a signiﬁcant attenuation of the diﬀerence in both excess returns and fundamentals
across the presidential cycle. Over the 1929-1998 period, removing the inﬂuence of these
shocks completely eliminates the diﬀerence in excess returns across the presidential cycle.
Over a more recent period, in which we have data on luxury consumption, removal of these
shocks reduces the diﬀerence in excess returns across the presidential cycle by over 50%.
Additionally, we ﬁnd that removing these large shocks substantially reduces the disparity
in luxury consumption growth over the presidential cycle. Based on these considerations we
1Speciﬁcally, we remove data from World War II (1941-45), the Korean Conﬂict (1950-1953), the Vietnam
War (1965-1975) and the Gulf War (1990-1991)
4conclude that large and unexpected diﬀerences in fundamentals over the presidential cycle
are an important source of the large observed diﬀerence in excess returns.
These empirical results are important for three reasons. First, the results suggest that a
signiﬁcant portion of the presidential puzzle can be explained by a traditional asset pricing
theory. Unexpectedly high excess returns coincided with unexpectedly strong fundamentals.
Historically, Democratic administrations have been marked by more and longer expansions,
stronger real output and luxury consumption growth as well as higher stock returns. In
this way, we make a connection between the political environment, fundamentals and stock
returns. Second, this paper highlights the importance of focusing on an appropriate con-
sumption measure when relating stock returns and fundamentals. A consumption measure
that is only appropriate in a frictionless environment, oﬀers few insights into the presi-
dential puzzle. Alternatively, a consumption measure that is appropriate in the presence
of market frictions such as limited participation or incomplete markets is revealing about
the nature of the puzzle. Accordingly, these results add to a growing body of evidence
supporting the view that recognizing incomplete consumption insurance and limited stock
market participation is important for explaining the behavior of asset returns. Third, we
provide additional evidence that the diﬀerence in excess returns and fundamentals across
the presidential cycle were largely unexpected. Examining expectations data shows that
neither stock returns nor real economic activity are expected to diﬀer across the presidential
cycle. Also we show that removing large and largely unforeseeable macroeconomic shocks
from the data considerably reduces the size of the presidential puzzle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the presidential
puzzle as documented by SCV. Section 3 discusses the issue of using consumption data
to measure fundamentals. We review the arguments for and against using per capita con-
sumption and luxury consumption data as a measure of fundamentals and discuss their
implications for our empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the data employed in our em-
5pirical analysis. Sections 5 and 6 present our empirical results and compares results for
per capita and luxury consumption data. Section 7 examines the link between presidential
administration and fundamentals and investigates the extent to which the large diﬀerences
in fundamentals across the presidential cycle can be regarded as unanticipated. Section 8
concludes and discusses directions for future research.
2 The Presidential Puzzle
SCV document large and persistent diﬀerences in excess returns across Democratic and
Republican presidential administrations over the period 1927-1998. This large return dif-
ferential has not gone unnoticed in the previous literature. SCV point out that previous
work by Hensel and Ziemba (1995), Herbst and Slinkman (1984), Huang (1985), Chitten-
den, Jensen and Johnson (1999) and Siegel (1998) documents the empirical regularity of
increased stock returns during Democratic presidencies.
SCV measure the size of the return premium by using CRSP data on the value-weighted
(VWR), equally-weighted (EWR) and size-sorted decile (DEC) portfolios. The case for a
Democratic return premium is made in Table II of their paper. Table I reproduces this
table.
The ﬁrst column of Table I presents estimates of the average excess return on stocks
over the period 1927-1998. Excess returns are formed by subtracting either the inﬂation
rate (INF) or the return on a 90 day T-bill (TBL) from the stock return. Interacting
these variables results in four diﬀerent measures of excess return. Glancing at Table I,
the diﬀerence in excess returns is extremely large over the presidential cycle. Over the
period 1927-1998, the diﬀerence in average excess return on the value-weighted portfolio
(VWR-TBL) between Democratic and Republican presidencies is over 9% on an annualized
basis. Looking at the equally-weighted portfolio (EWR-TBL) only makes the case stronger
as the return diﬀerential increases to 16.5%. This premium is robust to tests of statistical
6signiﬁcance and varying subsamples. SCV employ both a HAC estimator for the standard
error of the diﬀerence in returns as well as a test based on the bootstrap. Over the full
sample, three out of four of the tests of equal excess returns are rejected at the 3% level
or below. Only the diﬀerence between inﬂation adjusted returns on the value-weighted
portfolio (VWR-INF) is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent over the sample period.
Considering the size and robustness of this return premium it is somewhat surprising
that SCV are the ﬁrst to examine potential explanations for this large premium. In fact, they
note that while the eﬀect of politics on stock returns has been widely noted and discussed
in the media for quite some time, the link between politics and asset markets has been
virtually unexplored by economists.2 SCV are the ﬁrst to systematically inquire whether
the large return premium can be explained by diﬀerences in risk across the presidential
cycle. They do this in two ways.
First, following an extensive literature on the presence of business cycle ﬂuctuations in
asset returns they examine whether it is the case that Democratic presidencies are correlated
with business cycle risks which are known to change expected returns (Fama and French,
1989). Speciﬁcally they estimate the model,
re
t+1 = ® + ¯Rept + °0Xt + ut+1 (2.1)
where re
t+1 represents the monthly excess return,rt+1 ¡ rf;t, on either the CRSP value-
weighted or equally-weighted portfolio, Rept is a dummy variable taking the value of one
whenever a Democrat is in oﬃce and Xt is a vector of variables, related to the business
cycle, which have been shown to forecast future stock returns. Speciﬁcally, Xt includes the
(log) dividend yield, the diﬀerence in yield between a 10 year Treasury note and a 3 month
2The relationship between asset markets and politics has not gone entirely unnoticed. For example,
Shiller (2000) argues that Republican (congressional) promises of a capital gains tax cut actually buoyed
the market between 1994-1997. Also, Knight (2003) examines the extent to which diﬀerent presidential
platforms were capitalized into stock prices during the most recent presidential election.
7Treasury bill (term spread) and the diﬀerence in yield between high (AAA) and low (Baa)
quality corporate bonds.
The results of this analysis only strengthen the case for a Democratic return premium.3
Regardless of the excess return measure or the sample period examined, the return diﬀer-
ential is large and signiﬁcant. In every case the null hypothesis of equal excess returns can
be rejected at the 15% level and most tests reject the null hypothesis at or below the 5%
level. Essentially, the results of Table I are strengthened in the conditional analysis because
the business cycle related variables are virtually uncorrelated with the political party in
oﬃce and adding variables that predict stock returns eﬀectively reduces the variance of the
return innovation (ut+1), hence reducing the standard error of the estimates.
Before abandoning the possibility of a risk based explanation for the return premium
SCV examine one last measure of risk across the presidential cycle: the volatility of returns.
SCV examine whether risk, as measured by the standard deviation of monthly returns, is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between Democratic and Republican administrations. They ﬁnd that
volatility is actually slightly higher under Republican administrations and hence can not
explain the large return premium.
In the face of these failures to correlate excess returns with some measure of risk the
authors conclude that the diﬀerence in excess returns represents a puzzle. They state that
“given the results...we are left with a puzzle. How can such a large and persistent diﬀerence
in returns exist in an eﬃcient market if it is not a compensation for risk?” In what follows we
discuss the possibility that unexpected diﬀerences in returns were generated by unexpected
diﬀerences in fundamentals over the presidential cycle.
3For brevity’s sake we do not report these results here since they are so similar to the results in Table I.
Interested readers should consult Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) for further details.
83 Consumption Risk and the Presidential Puzzle
A fundamental tenet of asset pricing theory is that investors are paid returns in excess of the
risk-free rate for holding assets that covary positively with their own economic well-being.
Hence, assets which covary more with an investors economic well-being should, on average,
exhibit higher excess returns. This logic can be formalized in the context of a stochastic









mt+1 = a + bft+1
where re
t+1 represents the excess return on a risky asset and mt+1 represents the stochastic
discount factor. In consumption based models without any market frictions, the factor
represents marginal utility growth of the representative investor.
Re-arranging the stochastic discount factor model yields an expected return beta rela-








t+1 = ¯r;f¸ + ¯r;f (ft+1 ¡ E (f)) + "t+1
E ("t+1jΩt) = 0
where ¯r;f represents the population regression coeﬃcient from regressing excess returns
onto the factor (ft+1) and ¸ represents the market price of factor risk.
In this model, variations in realized returns are attributable to unexpected variation
in fundamentals (ft+1) as well as other idiosyncracies ("t+1). A main goal of this paper
9is to determine the extent to which the observed diﬀerence in excess returns across the
presidential cycle can be attributed to unexpected diﬀerences in fundamentals.
3.1 What is the appropriate measure of mt+1?
In order to operationalize the expected return-beta representation in our empirical work we
need to specify a measure of the stochastic discount factor, mt+1 = a + bft+1. The classic
way of specifying this is to assume a representative investor endowed with iso-elastic utility










(1982)). Incorporating this assumption into the expected return-beta framework results in







where ¯r;∆c represents the beta between stock returns and (log) consumption growth and
¸ represents the market price of risk.4
Before the above equation can be taken to the data, one must choose an empirical
proxy for c. In standard settings, when investors face no costs of investing and have access
to complete consumption insurance, c represents the consumption of the representative
investor. This motivation has led many researchers to use the per capita consumption
of all U.S. households as a proxy for c. The use of per capita consumption as a proxy
for c is not, however, unproblematic. A growing and important literature suggests that
stochastic discount factors which are constructed from measures of per capita consumption
are inappropriate from the viewpoint of economic theory. Theoretical objections to the use
of PCE consumption are principally raised on two grounds.
First, the standard Euler equation for consumption implies that the marginal rate of
substitution between present and future consumption of any investor is an appropriate
4The above relation is actually a ﬁrst order approximation to the consumption Euler equation. This
approximation becomes exact in an continuous time setting (Breeden (1979)).















where i indexes an investor. Extending this result to the case of per capita consumption is















is a direct consequence of market completeness. If investors are unable to fully insure against
idiosyncratic income shocks the individual Euler equation holds but the per capita Euler
equation does not (Constantinides (1982)).
Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002), present empirical evidence that recognizing the
disconnect between the individual and per capita consumption Euler equation is important.









, the explanatory power of the model increases and provides
more reasonable estimates of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Speciﬁcally, the authors
ﬁnd that the observed equity premium is consistent with the average stochastic discount






, results in a rejection of the standard CCAPM model and
would imply a magnitude of ° in the neighborhood of 50-100.
A second objection to the use of per capita consumption as a stochastic discount fac-
tor is that stock market participation is limited to the wealthiest households (Mankiw and
Zeldes (1991), Blume and Zeldes (1993), Haliassos and Bertaut (1995)). In the presence
of high ﬁxed costs to investment, only the consumption of inframarginal households is im-
portant for determining asset prices. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Brav, Constantinides
11and Geczy (2002) demonstrate that as per capita consumption is deﬁned over those house-
holds who actually own assets, the explanatory power of the per capita stochastic discount
factor increases and provides a more reasonable estimate of the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion. Moreover, the explanatory power of the stochastic discount factor increases as the
deﬁnition of an asset holder is successively tightened to recognize the limited participation
of households in the capital market.
In related work, A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2003), have recently stressed the impor-
tance of luxury good consumption for asset pricing. The authors, consider a model in which
consumption is of two kinds, necessities (C) and luxuries (L). In their model, necessities
(C) are subject to a subsistence level so that poor households only consume necessities and
no luxuries. Consequently, these households are unwilling to accept consumption risk so
they hold little equity and exhibit extremely stable consumption. Also, the authors argue
that necessities exhibit satiation at low levels so that most of the variation in consumption
comes from changes in luxury good consumption.
The authors show that a linearized version of their model admits an expected return-beta







where ¯r;∆l represents the population regression coeﬃcient between an asset’s return and
luxury consumption growth. Using data on retail sales from Tiﬀany’s department stores
as a proxy for L they test the above expected return-beta relationship. They compare the
explanatory power of their model in which mt+1 is proxied by luxury good consumption
and the traditional CCAPM in which mt+1 is proxied by per capita (PCE) consumption.
Their results show that the unconditional cross section of asset returns is better ex-
plained by luxury consumption than per capita consumption betas. Over the period 1961-
2001 using luxury consumption growth instead of per capita consumption growth to price
returns results in smaller pricing errors across the 25 Fama-French (1993) portfolios sorted
12by size and book to market. Also, similar to the ﬁndings of Brav, Constantinides and Geczy
(2002), they ﬁnd that estimates of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion are substantially
reduced when the luxury consumption data is employed as a proxy for the stochastic dis-
count factor. Over their sample period the traditional CCAPM implies a value of ° equal
to 50 while employing luxury consumption as the stochastic discount factor yields a value
of 7.
Based on these theoretical and empirical considerations we consider the explanatory
power of consumption based asset pricing models that take either per capita or luxury
consumption growth as a measure of the fundamental (stochastic discount factor).
4 Data
We make use of consumption data, stock return data and data on which party holds the
presidency at the annual frequency.
4.1 Consumption Data
4.1.1 per capita consumption
Our data on per capita consumption of nondurables and services comes from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) series. We use an-
nual data from 1961 through 1998. This series was obtained from the BEA (www.bea.gov).
The nominal consumption data is deﬂated using the Consumer Price Index of all urban
consumers (CPI-U). The CPI data is observed at the monthly frequency. We assume that
consumption takes place at a uniform rate over the year and deﬂate it using the average
level of the CPI over each of the twelve months within each quarter. The CPI series was
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov). Table II contains summary
statistics for (log) consumption growth and Figure I plots the data over the sample period
13along with NBER recession dates.
4.1.2 luxury good data
In this study we use annual sales data from Tiﬀany’s, an upscale department store, from
1961-1998. This is the same data analyzed in A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2003). The
authors retrieved the data from the COMPUSTAT database and since Tiﬀany’s main line of
business is jewelry, their sales were deﬂated using a jewelry price index. This series is only
available at the annual frequency since 1961. Readers interested in further details relating
to this data series and its construction are referred to the aforementioned paper. Table
II contains summary statistics for this series and Figure I plots the data over the sample
period along with NBER recession dates.
We rely solely on the Tiﬀany’s sales data as a measure of luxury good consumption which
ultimately proxies as a measure of the consumption of wealthy households. This is not the
only potential source of data on the consumption of the wealthy. Brav, Constantinides and
Geczy (2002), for example, directly measure the consumption of wealthy households through
the CEX database. Unfortunately, this data source is only available since the early 1980’s.
Since the CEX data became available there have been only two Democratic presidential
administrations. As a result, these data are not useful for measuring variation in excess
returns across the presidential cycle. The Tiﬀany’s data, however, is not the only potential
source of data on luxury consumption. A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2003) identify a
variety of other series which may be reasonable proxies for the consumption of the wealthy.
They include the consumption of luxury automobiles, ﬁne Bordeaux wines and expensive
Manhattan apartments. Unfortunately, each of these series suﬀers from a signiﬁcant durable
component, lack of data availability or both. Lastly, there are two subcategories of PCE
consumption which could arguably be classiﬁed as luxury consumption: PCE jewelry and
watches and PCE boats and aircraft. PCE jelwery and watches contains a substantial
14amount of non-luxury consumption while PCE boats and aircraft represent the consumption
of durable goods.
Besides the diﬃculties with other sources of luxury good consumption data we favor the
use of the Tiﬀany’s sales data because it has been proven to successfully price stock returns.
A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2003) show that using the Tiﬀany’s sales data instead of per
capita consumption results in a signiﬁcant improvement in the ﬁt and plausibility of the
expected return-beta relationship relative to models that employ per capita consumption
data. Our investigation of luxury consumption growth and the presidential puzzle serves
as a further test of this series as a proxy for the stochastic discount factor. While luxury
consumption growth has been shown to explain the unconditional cross section of returns,
that is no guarantee that it will be informative for explaining the large diﬀerences in returns
across the presidential cycle.
Figure 1 reveals a dramatic diﬀerence between the two consumption series. Per capita
consumption of nondurables and services varies little relative to the consumption of luxury
goods. The shaded regions corresponding to NBER recessions in Figure 1 reveal that while
both series rise and fall with the business cycle, luxury consumption growth is considerably
more sensitive to the business cycle. The behavior of these two series is also considerably
diﬀerent across the presidential cycle. While both per capita and luxury consumption
growth was higher over Democratic administrations, the behavior of luxury consumption
growth is signiﬁcantly more sensitive to the political aﬃliation of the president. Table II
reports that luxury consumption growth increased from roughly 6% to 12% per year between
Republican and Democratic administrations. Over the same period, per capita consumption
growth experienced a very modest increase from 1.98% to 2.04%. This dramatic diﬀerence
in the behavior of per capita and luxury consumption data has implications for their ability
to account for the presidential puzzle. The small diﬀerence in per capita consumption across
the presidential cycle implies that the consumption beta required to reconcile consumption
15growth with excess returns would be extremely large. In comparison, the large diﬀerence
in luxury consumption growth implies smaller and more reasonable estimates of beta will
be required to account for the variation in excess returns across the presidential cycle.
4.2 Stock Return Data
Following SCV we use the CRSP size-sorted decile portfolios, equally-weighted portfolio
and value-weighted portfolio as measures of stock returns. To calculate excess returns we
also use the return on the 90 Day T-bill. Table II contains summary statistics for the stock
return data. We note that while our sample period does not coincide with that of SCV due
to the lack of consumption data in the early part of their sample period, the presidential
puzzle is alive and well in our sample period. The diﬀerence in average annual excess return
on the value weighted portfolio is 7.2% between 1961 and 1998. Consistent with the ﬁndings
of SCV the premium is larger for smaller stocks. Over the same period, the diﬀerence in
excess returns in the equally-weighted portfolio is roughly 14% between Democratic and
Republican administrations.
4.3 Political Data
We use a dummy variable, Rept, which takes the value 1 if a Republican is in oﬃce from the
end of year t to the end of year t+1 and 0 otherwise. Over the sample period no third-party
candidates were elected to oﬃce. This data was obtained directly from Santa-Clara and
Valkanov (2003). Table II displays summary statistics for this variable.
Our empirical work focuses on examining how excess returns and fundamentals change
across the presidential cycle. Speciﬁcally, at time t we are interested in the information that
is relevant for returns measured between the end of year t and the end of year t + 1. Since
presidential elections are held in November and the presidency changes hands in January,
investors are always aware of which party will be in oﬃce at the beginning of any year
16following an election. Accordingly, the only uncertainty about the party of the president
surrounds the possibility of a president’s removal from oﬃce. For example, a president may
be assassinated (Kennedy), resign (Nixon) or may otherwise be removed from oﬃce. Even
if this were to occur, however, it would be extremely unlikely that the following president
would have a diﬀerent party aﬃliation than the previous one.5 As a result, we simply assume
perfect foresight. Investors are assumed to know at the beginning of any year, which party
will hold oﬃce during that year.
5 Consumption Beta and the Presidential Cycle
In this section we examine the ability of consumption based models to explain excess returns
across the presidential cycle. In doing so we allow for the political party of the president
to potentially aﬀect both risk and return through varying consumption betas and alphas.
Following a long line of research investigating time varying risk and return, we work with
the following empirical model,
re
i;t+1 = ®i;t + ¯i;t (ft+1 ¡ E (f)) + "t+1 (5.4)
®i;t = ®i;Dem + (®i;Rep ¡ ®i;Dem) ¤ Rept
¯i;t = ¯i;Dem + (¯i;Rep ¡ ¯i;Dem) ¤ Rept
where ft+1 represents either per capita or luxury consumption growth. This model comes
from a variety of empirical studies investigating conditioning variables and stock returns.
Examples of this line of research include Shanken (1990), Ferson and Harvey (1999), Ferson
and Korajczyck (1995), Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Lewellen (1999). While similar in
spirit, these studies diﬀer from ours in two main respects.
First, these studies typically identify the factor (ft+1) with a market portfolio or a set
5This has occurred once since 1789. Andrew Johnson, a Democrat, succeeded Lincoln, a Republican,
after he was assassinated in 1865.
17of portfolios while we identify the factor with a more fundamental determinant of asset
prices.6 In the current context, identifying the factor with a portfolio would preclude us
from investigating why excess returns on the market portfolio itself vary so much across
the presidential cycle. Secondly, these studies examine how risk and return vary with
indicators that proxy for the such as the interest rate, the dividend yield or the slope of the
term structure. In contrast, we are interested in how returns change with the presidential
cycle.
Our main hypothesis is that neither risk nor expected return varies across the presiden-
tial cycle so that (®i;Rep ¡ ®i;Dem) = 0 and (¯i;Rep ¡ ¯i;Dem) = 0. Under this hypothesis
all variation in excess returns can be attributed to unexpected changes in fundamentals
(ft+1 ¡ E (f)) and other unpredictable components of returns ("t+1).
At this point we stress the importance of allowing for changes in both expected return
(i.e., (®i;Rep ¡ ®i;Dem) 6= 0) and risk (i.e., (¯i;Rep ¡ ¯i;Dem) 6= 0) when investigating the
predictive power of conditioning variables for stock returns. In principle, one could imagine
estimating a model which only allows for time variation in alpha,
re
i;t = ®i + (®i;Rep ¡ ®i;Dem) ¤ Rept + ¯i (ft+1 ¡ E (f)) + "t
and testing whether alpha varies between Democratic and Republican administrations. We
do not follow this approach due to the link between risk and return. As SCV point out,
there is reason to believe that diﬀerences in return are related to systematic diﬀerences
in ﬁscal and taxation policies, and hence risk, across the presidential cycle. SCV explore
the possibility of varying risk across the presidential cycle by examining diﬀerences in the
volatility in returns. In consumption based models, risk is deﬁned as the covariance between
asset returns and the relevant consumption measure. Accordingly, changing risk is directly
6The market portfolio is typically deﬁned as the CRSP value-weighted portfolio. Some authors have also
examined the case for time variation in the betas of the three Fama-French (1993) portfolios and the four
portfolios of Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995).
18measured by whether or not beta changes across the presidential cycle. In this way, our
model directly investigates the case for varying risk across the presidential cycle in a manner
that is consistent with an intertemporal framework. Also, from an econometric perspective,
Ferson and Harvey (1999) point out that conditioning variables which appear signiﬁcant in
speciﬁcations like the one above may simply signal that beta is time varying. If changes
in beta are correlated with changes in the conditioning variables then an omitted variables
problem arises and inference on (®i;Rep ¡ ®i;Dem) becomes biased.
5.0.1 Model Estimates
In Table III we report model estimates from the speciﬁcation that allows for changes in
alpha and beta across the presidential cycle. We report results which employ either per
capita consumption or luxury consumption data as a proxy for the stochastic discount
factor (ft). In each case, the model was estimated using excess returns on the ten CRSP
decile portfolios and the value and equally-weighted portfolios between 1961 and 1998. The
model was estimated by OLS.7
We report results for per capita consumption in the ﬁrst three columns and results for
luxury consumption in the last three columns. We report results for the interaction terms
((®i;Rep ¡ ®i;Dem);(¯i;Rep ¡ ¯i;Dem)) as well as the percentage change in beta across the
presidential cycle (%∆¯i) to conserve space.
The results when per capita consumption is employed as a stochastic discount factor
are in line with those of SCV. Republican administrations predict future stock returns
and the eﬀect is more pronounced for smaller stock portfolios. At the annual frequency
the estimate of the diﬀerences in alpha across Republican and Democratic administrations,
(®i;Rep ¡ ®i;Dem), is large and declines in magnitude for larger stock portfolios. For example,
the estimated diﬀerence in alpha across the presidential cycle is estimated to be 21% in the
7Since the dependent variables are identical across all the test portfolios, equation by equation OLS is
equivalent to a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimator.
19case of the value-weighted portfolio and 29% for the equally weighted portfolio. Moreover,
each estimate of (®i;Rep ¡ ®i;Dem) is highly signiﬁcant across all twelve of the test portfolios.
In summary, when per capita consumption is employed as a stochastic discount factor, the
predictability of excess returns across the presidential cycle still emerges as a robust feature
of the data.
The considerable variation in per capita alphas, by themselves, however, do not con-
stitute a puzzle. Signiﬁcant decreases in per capita consumption betas would be in line
with the decrease in alphas. Reduced excess returns would coincide with reduced system-
atic risk. While the data do suggest signiﬁcant variation in consumption betas across the
presidential cycle, the pattern of variation is inconsistent with a risk based explanation to
the presidential puzzle. For each of the twelve portfolios, per capita consumption betas
are estimated to increase during Republican presidencies suggesting that returns should in
fact be higher during these administrations. These increases are both large and statistically
signiﬁcant. The maximum p-value on the diﬀerence in per capita consumption beta across
all twelve portfolios is only 0.07 and beta typically more than doubles between Democratic
and Republican administrations. In the case of the value-weighted portfolio, the diﬀerence
in beta is signiﬁcant at the 1% level and it is estimated that beta increases by 286% across
the presidential cycle. These ﬁndings, along with the considerable decreases in alpha across
the presidential cycle suggest that employing per capita consumption growth as a stochastic
discount factor can provide few insights into the nature of the presidential puzzle. Quite
the opposite, this approach only deepens the puzzle.
Results employing luxury consumption data are considerably more promising. The
estimates in Table III show little evidence of signiﬁcant variation in alphas across the pres-
idential cycle. The minimum p-value across the twelve test portfolios is only 0.21 and most
of the p-values are in the 0.2-0.6 range. Comparing these results with those for per capita
consumption, it is clear that the lack of statistical signiﬁcance comes from a sharp reduction
20in the estimated size of the diﬀerence in alpha, (®i;Rep ¡ ®i;Dem), rather than an increase
in its estimated standard error. Comparing the second and fourth column of Table III
reveals that the estimated diﬀerence in alpha decreases by roughly 50% between the per
capita and luxury consumption results while the estimated standard errors are very similar
in magnitude.
The ﬁnal two columns of Table III present estimates of the amount of time variation
in luxury beta across the presidential cycle. These results do not provide any strong ev-
idence in favor of variation in beta that coincides with the presidential cycle. While the
point estimates of the diﬀerence in beta, (¯i;Rep ¡ ¯i;Dem), are all positive none are statis-
tically signiﬁcant. The p-values range from 0.57 to 0.88 suggesting little evidence that risk
changes during Republican administrations. Also, as was the case for estimated alphas,
the estimated change in luxury consumption beta is uniformly smaller across all portfolios
when the factor is identiﬁed with luxury consumption. In the case of the value-weighted
portfolio, the luxury consumption beta is estimated to increase by 32% while the per capita
consumption beta is estimated to increase by over 250% across the presidential cycle.
These results suggest that the size of the presidential puzzle is substantially reduced
when viewed through the lens of a single factor, luxury consumption beta model. Even
without any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in risk across Republican and Democratic presidencies,
there is no signiﬁcant evidence in favor of predictably high returns during Democratic
administrations. The source of the luxury beta model’s explanatory power can be seen
by examining Table II. The growth in luxury consumption reveals a dramatic increase
in luxury consumption growth during Democratic presidencies (12.27% vs. 5.96%). In
the context of the luxury beta model, the increase in excess returns is attributed to this
unexpected increase in consumption growth. These luxury consumption results suggest
that the large increase in excess returns over Democratic administrations can, in part, be
explained by traditional asset pricing theory. Unexpectedly high excess returns coincided
21with unexpectedly strong fundamentals. What may be regarded as untraditional in this
explanation is not the underlying theory but rather the measure of fundamentals that we
consider. While these Tiﬀany sales data are far from commonplace in the empirical asset
pricing literature, we stress that these data have previously been shown to be informative
for the unconditional cross section of stock returns (A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2003)).
We view these results as further evidence that luxury consumption, at least relative to per
capita consumption, is a meaningful stochastic discount factor for pricing returns.
At this point, we note that while these results suggest that variation in luxury consump-
tion is important for understanding the diﬀerence in returns across the presidential cycle,
it is still the case that Republican administrations have forecasted low luxury consumption
growth. In this sense, our results shift the focus of the presidential puzzle. The relevant
question becomes “why were fundamentals so diﬀerent over the presidential cycle?” instead
of “why were excess returns so diﬀerent over the presidential cycle?”. We take up the ques-
tion of why fundamentals were so diﬀerent over the presidential cycle and whether these
diﬀerences were forecastable in what follows. Before examining these questions, however,
we examine the quantitative signiﬁcance of unexpected changes in luxury consumption for
the presidential puzzle.
6 The Quantitative Signiﬁcance of Variation in Luxury Con-
sumption
In this section we examine whether the size of the change in luxury consumption growth
across the presidential cycle can explain a signiﬁcant portion of the large return diﬀerential
across Democratic and Republican presidencies. We quantitatively assess how well changes
in luxury consumption explain the change in average excess returns for each of the twelve
test portfolios over the period 1961-1998.
22Note that in the case of the single factor luxury consumption model without any diﬀer-
ences in risk or return across the presidential cycle we have that,
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i;t+1 represents the excess return on portfolio i and xRep represents the sample av-
erage over either Republican (Rept = 1) or Democratic (Rept = 0) administrations. Using
estimates of ¯i, we can decompose the change in expected returns across the presidential




) and a component due to
other unpredictable components of returns (∆"i). In Table IV we perform this decomposi-
tion using both the luxury beta and per capita consumption beta.8
We report the average annual diﬀerence in returns across the presidential cycle between
1961 and 1998 for the twelve test portfolios considered in the ﬁrst column of Table IV. In
the next columns we display the amount of the diﬀerence in excess returns attributable to
changes in fundamentals, the diﬀerence in returns due to other unpredictable components of
returns and the proportion of the change that can be attributed to changes in fundamentals.
The decomposition is performed using OLS estimates of the single factor model above.
The results in Table IV suggest that changes in luxury consumption growth are impor-
tant for understanding the nature of the presidential puzzle. The proportion of the change
in excess returns attributable to changes in luxury consumption growth ranges from 24% in
the case of the equally-weighted portfolio to 48% for the portfolio of largest stocks (DEC10-
TBL). Consistent with the ﬁndings of SCV, changes in luxury consumption growth are less
informative for the diﬀerence in the returns on small stock portfolios. Changing fundamen-
tals account for 39% of the diﬀerence in the value-weighted portfolio and 24% of the change
8Although our previous analysis raises questions concerning the validity of the single factor per capita
consumption beta model, we include it for comparative purposes.
23in the equally-weighted portfolio. Also, the proportion of the variation in return explained
by changes in luxury consumption growth rises steadily from 28% of the smallest stock
portfolio to 48% of the largest stock portfolio. When per capita consumption growth is em-
ployed as the stochastic discount factor, fundamentals have little role to play in explaining
the presidential puzzle. At most, 3% of the change in excess returns across the presidential
cycle can be attributed to unexpected changes in PCE consumption growth. Accordingly,
even if one is convinced that per capita consumption growth is a valid stochastic discount
factor it oﬀers few insights into the presidential puzzle.
At this point we wish to stress that clearly neither changes in luxury or per capita
consumption growth provides a complete explanation to the presidential puzzle. We view
our results this far in two ways. First, luxury consumption growth is more informative
in explaining the large diﬀerences in excess returns across the presidential cycle than per
capita consumption growth. We have made this point in two ways. First, the results of the
previous section suggest that excess returns over 1961-1998 are qualitatively consistent with
identifying luxury consumption growth as the stochastic discount factor whereas they are
not consistent with per capita consumption. Employing per capita consumption growth as
the factor implies that betas, and hence risk, decrease during Democratic administrations
while returns increase. The results employing luxury consumption growth suggest that nei-
ther risk nor return is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the presidential cycle. Increased excess
returns are attributed to unexpectedly strong fundamentals over Democratic administra-
tions. The results in Table IV oﬀer a more quantitative view of the contribution of luxury
consumption growth in explaining the presidential puzzle. While the ﬁt is less than per-
fect, considering the eﬀorts of SCV, explaining 40% of the observed change in returns with
changes in fundamentals provides considerable insight into the nature of the presidential
puzzle. In this way, these results establish a link between the political landscape, economic
fundamentals and stock returns.
247 Predictability, Presidential Cycles and Luxury Consump-
tion Growth
A key assumption of this analysis has been that diﬀerences in fundamentals, i.e., luxury
consumption growth, across Democratic and Republican administrations were unexpected.
In this section we investigate the extent to which this assumption is reasonable and docu-
ment the source of the diﬀerence in the behavior of luxury consumption growth across the
presidential cycle.
Recall, that our asset pricing model assumes that fundamentals are unpredictable. In
particular, note that we employ the factor representation,
re
i;t+1 = ¸¯i + ¯i (ft+1 ¡ E (f)) + "t+1
and that we have implicitly assumed no conditional mean dynamics in the factor so that
E (ft+1jRept = 0) = E (ft+1jRept = 1) = E (f). If the factor is predictable, then the above
asset pricing model is inappropriate. In particular, if the factor is largely predictable one
would expect the market price of risk (¸) to vary across the presidential cycle. Since the
factor is a proxy for a representative investor’s marginal utility growth, the market price
of risk should fall in good times when the factor is expected to be robust, and rise when
economic fundamentals are expected to be weak.9 Moreover, if the diﬀerences in luxury
consumption growth were predictable one would counterfactually expect excess returns to
be higher during Republican administrations when fundamentals were predictably weaker.
While our explanation for the diﬀerence in returns across the presidential cycle rests
on the assumption that diﬀerences in luxury consumption growth be unpredictable, the
9This statement can be formalized in the context of a stochastic discount factor model. Recall that in
a conditional framework the asset pricing relation Et (mt+1 (r
e
t+1)) = 0 implies that Et (r
e
t+1) = ¯t¸t where
¯t is the asset’s conditional beta with the stochastic discount factor and ¸t =
V art(mt+1)
Et(mt+1) is the conditional
price of risk. Assuming that the variance of the stochastic discount factor is constant, an increase in the
expected value of mt+1 implies a decrease in the market price of risk.
25data appear to suggest otherwise. Recall that Table II documents that luxury consumption
growth more than doubled between Republican and Democratic administrations.
Consider the following forecasting model,
∆lt+1 = ® + ¯Rept + ´t+1;
and note that ∆lt+1 represents the real sales growth of Tiﬀany’s from January 1st to De-
cember 31st of any year and that Rept is in the investor’s information set on January 1st
of each year so that the above equation represents a realistic forecasting model. Over the
period 1961-1998, estimating this model results in point estimates consistent with Table II,
¯ = ¡6%, and a p-value of 4% suggesting the possibility of some systematic relationship
between current presidential aﬃliation and future luxury consumption growth. A main con-
tribution of this paper has been to document that the predictability of presidential party
for stock returns is actually related to the fact that presidential party has predicted growth
in luxury consumption. In what follows we draw a connection between luxury consumption
growth, the presidential cycle and the business cycle. We then examine the evidence that
these diﬀerences in economic fundamentals were predictable.
7.1 Luxury Consumption, Business Cycles and the Presidential Cycle
Since 1929, Republican presidencies have born the brunt of economic recessions. Republican
administrations have spent considerably more time in recessionary periods. Consider a
contraction index, contt, which tracks the number of quarters within a year spent in recession
as deﬁned by the NBER business cycle dating committee. We document the disparity
between Democratic and Republican administrations in Figure II. Panels on the left display
histograms of contt+1 conditional on Rept = 0 (Democratic administrations). Histograms
conditional on Rept = 1 (Republican administrations) are displayed on the right. The top
row displays histograms covering the period 1929-1998. The bottom row displays histograms
covering the more recent sample 1961-1998.
26Since 1929 Republican administrations have spent roughly 1.18 quarters in recession
per year while Democratic administrations have typically spent 0.40 quarters per year in
recession. Apart from the large diﬀerence in means, Republican presidencies were much
more likely to experience deep recessions lasting more than two quarters and Democratic
administrations were considerably more likely to experience recession free years. The same
pattern is evident over the shorter sample period since 1961. The period since 1961 has
enjoyed considerably more economic stability than the period since 1929 so that the average
number of quarters spent in a contraction is lower for both Democrats and Republicans.
The relative disparity, however, is even more striking. Since 1961 Democratic administra-
tions spent, on average, 0.16 quarters in recession while Republicans were ﬁve times more
susceptible to downturns in the business cycle.
This look at the diﬀering business cycle experience of Democrats and Republicans indi-
cates that part of the diﬀerence in stock returns may be attributable to an overall diﬀerence
in economic performance across the two administrations. Luxury consumption growth, as
proxied by Tiﬀany’s sales, is more responsive to economic downturns than per capita con-
sumption and hence more informative about the business cycle risk of the stock market.
We provide quantitative evidence that the diﬀerence in the behavior of luxury consumption
growth across the presidential cycle is due, in large part, to the diﬀerence in business cycle
experience in Table V. In Table V we present estimates from regressing both luxury con-
sumption growth and per capita consumption growth on, Rept, as well as the contraction
indicator, contt+1.
This analysis is meant to clarify the source of the predictive power of presidential
party for consumption growth. Presidential party could forecast future luxury consumption
growth because presidential party forecasts future changes in the business cycle or it may
have predictive content that is unrelated to the business cycle. As an example, Democratic
administrations might be more likely to shift the tax burden towards the wealthy thereby
27forecasting a future decline in luxury spending regardless of the state of the business cy-
cle. The results in Table V indicate that the bulk of the predictive content of presidential
party works though its ability to forecast future recessionary periods. The ﬁrst column of
Table V shows that without controlling for contractions, Republican administrations are
associated with 6% lower luxury growth and the eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant. Controlling for
contractions reduces the point estimate on Rept by 43% and renders it insigniﬁcant at the
15% level.
At the same time, contractionary periods have a large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on luxury consumption growth. A single contractionary quarter results in an expected
fall in luxury consumption of 4%. This eﬀect is large. Two quarters of recession are
expected to decrease luxury consumption growth by nearly one standard deviation. Also,
a single contractionary quarter has a larger and more signiﬁcant eﬀect on luxury growth
than does a Republican administration. These results are also large when compared to the
corresponding results for per capita consumption. One quarter of a contraction only has
roughly 20% of the eﬀect on per capita consumption as it does on luxury consumption.
This diﬀerence in sensitivity to the business cycle is likely due to the fact that a large
share of per capita consumption includes necessities which do not respond to economic
downturns. Luxury consumption, however, surely contains a variety of goods that can be
and are foregone in the face of bad economic times. Moreover, these are precisely the kinds
of goods that are likely important for determining the welfare of those households actually
investing in the stock market.
7.2 The Case for Ex Ante Predictability of Fundamentals and Stock Re-
turns Across the Presidential Cycle
In light of the evidence that Republican administrations have predicted future recessions
it is necessary to ask whether investors actually expected poorer economic times during
28Republican administrations. Importantly, it is important to distinguish between ex-ante
predictability and ex-post statistical signiﬁcance. Clearly, there is an ex-post statistically
signiﬁcant relation between current presidential party and future economic performance.
The more important question, however, is whether economic participants were aware of any
link between presidential party, real activity and stock returns. As previously noted, if in-
vestors actually expected poorer economic performance during Republican administrations
that would suggest an increase in expected returns which would be diﬃcult to reconcile with
the data. We investigate whether any relationship between presidential party, the business
cycle and stock returns was known to investors by examining real-time data on expecta-
tions. We use data from the Livingston Survey of professional forecasters to determine if
economic forecasters were aware of any systematic relationship between presidential party
and the economy.
7.2.1 Livingston Survey Data
In 1946 a Philadelphia newspaper columnist, Joseph Livingston, began asking business
economists about their expectations concerning a number of economic variables. Livingston
wrote a column summarizing the responses of the respondents and published it in a variety
of Philadelphia newspapers. Over the years, the opinions of economists from industry,
government, banking and academia were included in the survey. Since 1990, the survey has
been managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia where it is published today.
The survey data used in this study are available from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve
Bank (www.phil.frb.org/econ/liv).
The survey is an important source for data on the actual expectations of economists
and other professional forecasters. Unlike econometric analyses which suﬀer from sample
selection bias, look ahead bias, and a variety of other problems, the Livingston Survey data
represent actual expectations which were elicited in real-time. The survey has been used
29as source data in a number of studies concerned with the expectations of economic agents.
Turnovsky (1970) used the Livingston price forecasts in early tests of rational expectations
models. Gultekin (1983) studied the joint behavior of stock market and inﬂation forecasts.
More recently, Ball and Croushore (1995) have studied the eﬀects of monetary policy on
inﬂation expectations.
Our primary interest in the expectations data is to examine whether economists and
professional forecasters actually expected diﬀerences in stock returns or economic perfor-
mance across the presidential cycle. We focus on three measures, expected annual real
returns, expected annual real GNP/GDP growth and the expected annual change in the
unemployment rate.10 Forecasts of the level of the S&P 500 proxy for the stock market.11
Real returns and real GDP expectations are formed using expectations for the CPI. We
exclusively rely on the CPI since the survey only included questions about interest rates
in the early 90’s.12 For every series, the survey asks each respondent to forecast the level
of the appropriate series in six and twelve months time. There is some uncertainty about
precisely when forecasts were being made. The survey was conducted by mail and so it is
impossible to know exactly when forecasts were made and what information was available
to forecasters. This is problematic in the case of stock market forecasts since markets can
move substantially over a period of just a few days. Following Gultekin (1983), we use
the implied return over the last six months of the year, taken as the percent change in
the forecasted level of the S&P 500 in six and twelve months, as our measure of expected
return. In the case of the more slowly moving real GDP and unemployment rate, we use
the level of the series when the survey was mailed out.
10Prior to 1992, forecasters were asked about their expectations regarding GNP.
11The S&P 400 was the stock market variable used in the survey prior to 1990.
12Throughout the paper we have examined the behavior of excess returns. Due to the lack of expectations
data on interest rates it is impossible to construct excess return forecasts using these data. As long as the
real interest rate is relatively constant, using real return forecasts should be informative for expected excess
returns.
30Our expectations data spans 1953-1998 in the case of the real GDP and excess return
forecasts. Unemployment forecasts are available from 1961. For each series we use the
survey from December of the previous year to extract expectations for the current year.
For example, real GDP, real return and unemployment expectations from 1955 are collected
from the Livingston survey conducted in December of 1954. Also, we aggregate expectations
by using the median forecast.
In Table VI we present results from regressing expectations on Rept. The evidence is
very weak for any systematic relationship between expectations and the presidential cycle.
In every case the point estimates are very small and insigniﬁcant. In the case of real ac-
tivity measures, real GDP is expected to decrease slightly but unemployment is expected
to slightly decrease during Republican administrations. Interestingly, real returns are esti-
mated to increase by 0.8% during Republican administrations which is at least suggestive
that forecasters might perceive some increased business cycle risk during Republican ad-
ministrations. Also, real stock return expectations exhibit the highest R2 with presidential
party. Variation in Rept explains 4% of the variance in the median stock market forecast.
The estimate, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant and more importantly is not backed up
by any evidence that forecasters actually perceive any risk of decreased real activity during
these periods. Based on these expectations data we can only conclude that both the large
diﬀerence in returns and fundamentals over the presidential cycle were largely unexpected.
In this sense, our interpretation of the data is consistent with that of SCV. SCV also con-
clude that the large diﬀerence in returns across the presidential cycle represents unexpected
diﬀerences in returns. Importantly, however, our analysis links the unexpected diﬀerence in
excess returns to unexpected diﬀerences in fundamentals, i.e. luxury consumption growth,
over the presidential cycle.
317.2.2 The Depression, Military Conﬂict and the Presidential Puzzle
In this section, we examine the robustness of the presidential puzzle to large and unforesee-
able economic shocks. We remove the eﬀect of the most severe depression years (1929-1935)
as well as every major military conﬂict between 1929 and 1998. Our motivation for examin-
ing the robustness of the presidential puzzle to the removal of these macroeconomic shocks
is two fold.
First, this analysis provides an additional means of assessing whether the large diﬀer-
ences in excess returns across the presidential cycle represent a predictable or unpredictable
component of returns. A lack of robustness of the presidential puzzle to the exclusion of
these largely unpredictable shocks would call into question its uniformity and predictability
over time. This analysis complements the subsample analysis of SCV. Unlike SCV who
examine two diﬀerent subsamples of the data (1927-1961, 1961-1998) we examine periods
which would likely be most informative to investors trying to gauge the size and stability
of the Democratic return premium when making decisions about their future investments.
Secondly, this analysis provides a further test of whether diﬀerences in overall economic
activity, and in particular diﬀerences in luxury consumption growth, are related to the pres-
idential puzzle. To the extent that removing these large shocks from the data attenuates the
diﬀerence in excess returns over the presidential cycle we would expect a similar attenuation
in luxury consumption growth and other fundamental measures of economic activity such
as the contraction index.
Table VII lists the periods which were excluded from the sample and the diﬀerence
in mean excess returns on the value-weighted and equally-weighted portfolios as well as
the diﬀerence in the mean of the contraction index and per capita and luxury consumption
growth. We examine the data over two periods, 1929-1998 as well as the more recent sample
between 1961 and 1998 which has been the major focus of this paper. For each period we
report results for the full sample and the sample which excludes the Depression and major
32military conﬂicts in Table VIII.13
Table VII shows that over the long sample, 1929-1998, the presidential puzzle is nearly
eliminated after removing these macroeconomic shocks. Omitting the severe depression
years and major military conﬂicts, reduces the annualized diﬀerence in excess returns on
the equally-weighted portfolio from over 15% per year in the full sample to just 0.11%
per year in the restricted sample. Similarly, the diﬀerence in the excess return on the
value-weighted portfolio shrinks from nearly 10% to 0.11%. It is also the case that the
diﬀerence in general economic performance is much narrower over the restricted sample.
Between 1929-1998, Republican presidencies experienced 0.80 more quarters of recession
per year than their Democratic counterparts. Over the restricted sample Republicans were
only subject to 0.21 more quarters of recession per year. Ultimately, we are interested in
whether the reduction of the diﬀerence in excess returns coincides with a similar reduction
in the diﬀerence of our measure of fundamentals - luxury consumption growth. Since luxury
consumption growth is only observed between 1961 and 1998, we turn to an analysis of this
time period.
Over this more recent sample, 1961-1998, removing large shocks results in a somewhat
smaller reduction in the size of the presidential puzzle. Over this period the restricted sam-
ple amounts to removing the Vietnam and Gulf War periods from the data. In the case of
the equally-weighted portfolio, the diﬀerence in annualized excess returns falls from roughly
14% over the full sample to 5.3% during the restricted sample that omits the Vietnam and
Gulf War periods. General economic performance also converges over this period during the
restricted sample. Over the full sample,1961-1998, Republican administrations were subject
to 0.6 more quarters of recession per year than their Democratic counterparts. Over the
13Table VIII does not provide any standard errors or tests of statistical signiﬁcance. In this context it
is not clear how to account for the fact that our removal of these periods is based, at least in part, on the
excess return data. On this point, we leave it to the reader to decide how to interpret the results of this
analysis.
33restricted sample, the diﬀerence narrows to 0.2 more quarters of recession per year. More
importantly, diﬀerences in luxury consumption growth across the presidential cycle also
converge in the restricted sample. Over the full sample, luxury consumption growth was
6.0 percentage points higher under Democratic administrations. Over the restricted sam-
ple, luxury consumption growth was only 1.2 percentage points higher during Democratic
administrations.
Per capita consumption growth is considerably less sensitive to the inclusion or omission
of these macroeconomic shocks. Whether the Vietnam and Gulf War periods are included
or excluded per capita consumption growth is nearly constant across the presidential cycle.
Excluding these periods results in per capita consumption growth which is marginally higher
during Republican administrations (0.9 percentage points) while including these shocks
results in marginally lower consumption growth during Republican administrations (0.02
percentage points).
These results show that a signiﬁcant portion of the presidential puzzle is generated by the
behavior of asset markets during the Great Depression and periods of military conﬂict. This
suggests that it may be diﬃcult to interpret the Democratic return premium as a uniform
and stable phenomenon that would have been anticipated by investors. Rather, this analysis
indicates that the diﬀerence in excess returns may be due to a few unexpected yet persistent
economic shocks. Furthermore, these results demonstrate a link between the behavior of
luxury consumption growth, the overall macroeconomy and asset returns. Removing these
shocks makes the diﬀerence in both excess returns and luxury consumption growth between
Democratic and Republican administrations small. Accordingly, a substantial portion of the
diﬀerence in excess returns across the presidential cycle can be attributed to concomitant
diﬀerences in fundamentals that were precipitated by large macroeconomic shocks.
348 Conclusion
Diﬀerences in excess stock returns across Democratic and Reopublican presidential admin-
istrations are large. In this paper we have investigated this presidential puzzle through
the lens of the consumption based asset pricing model. We ﬁnd contrasting results de-
pending on whether the fundamental stochastic discount factor is proxied by per capita
(PCE) consumption or the consumption of luxury goods as proxied by the sales of Tiﬀany’s
department stores.
Empirical implementation of the CCAPM using per capita consumption as the stochastic
discount factor is unable to oﬀer any insights into the nature of the presidential puzzle. The
estimated diﬀerence in alpha across Democratic and Republican administrations is both
large and statistically signiﬁcant when excess returns are related to per capita consumption
growth. Also, per capita consumption betas are estimated to vary over the presidential
cycle in a way that is at considerable odds with the data. Beta risk is estimated to increase
during Republican administrations when excess returns decreased.
Implementing the CCAPM using the growth in luxury good consumption as a stochastic
discount factor considerably reduces the size of the presidential puzzle. Across all twelve test
portfolios, the estimated diﬀerence in alpha and beta is sharply reduced and insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero when luxury consumption growth is employed as a stochastic discount
factor. These results complement the ﬁndings of A¨ ıt-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2003) who
ﬁnd that luxury consumption growth is informative for the unconditional cross section of
returns. Our results indicate that luxury consumption growth is also useful for explaining
some of the conditional features of excess returns.
Quantitatively, between 25% to 40% of the diﬀerence in excess returns can be attributed
to diﬀerences in luxury consumption growth across the presidential cycle. The large diﬀer-
ence in luxury growth is shown to be a consequence of the increased incidence of recessions
during Republican administrations. Luxury growth is very sensitive to changes in the busi-
35ness cycle whereas per capita consumption is not. As a result, luxury growth is a better
indicator of the business cycle risk inherent in stocks.
We also investigate whether the large diﬀerences in economic fundamentals and stock
returns across the presidential cycle can reasonably be interpreted as unexpected. Using
data from the Livingston survey of professional forecasters we ﬁnd no evidence that expec-
tations of either real activity measures or excess stock returns vary with the presidential
administration. Also, we show that the diﬀerence in both excess returns and economic
fundamentals are reduced considerably when large economic shocks are removed from the
data. Removing the inﬂuence of the Great Depression and major military conﬂicts results
in smaller diﬀerences in excess returns, business cycle experience and luxury consumption
growth across the presidential cycle. Accordingly, we conclude that much of the increase
in excess returns during Democratic presidencies between 1961 and 1998 was due to unex-
pectedly strong economic fundamentals during these periods.
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39Table I: Average Returns under Republican and Democratic Presidents
This table is reprinted from Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and reports mean excess and real
returns of value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios, VWR-TBL, VWR-INF, EWR-TBL, EWR-
INF and the real interest rate, TBL-INF, during Republican (RD) and Democratic (DD) presidential
terms. All rates are represented in annualized percentage points. The numbers below the coeﬃcients
in the RD and DD columms represent p-values under the null hypothesis that the estimates are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The ﬁrst number is the p-value of the test conducted using
Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation robust t-statistics. The second number
is the p-value of the test conducted using a conditional bootstrap t-statistic. The p-values below
the coeﬃcients in the Diﬀ column are obtained from the Newey-West and conditional bootstrap
t-statistics under the null that there is no diﬀerence in returns during Republican and Democratic
regimes. The row T/Republicans displays the number of observations and the number of months of
Republican administrations during the estimation period. The row ¯ R2 displays the average adjusted
R2 obtained in the regressions.
1927:01-1998:12 1927:01-1962:12 1963:01-1998:12
RD DD Diﬀ RD DD Diﬀ RD DD Diﬀ
VWR-TBL 1.69 10.69 -9.01 1.68 11.13 -9.45 2.60 9.45 -6.85
0.33 0.00 0.03 0.40 0.01 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.07
0.31 0.01 0.02 0.39 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.09
VWR-INF 4.25 9.56 -5.31 5.22 8.54 -3.32 4.50 10.21 -5.71
0.12 0.00 0.13 0.22 0.03 0.17 0.10 0.00 0.12
0.13 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.16 0.10 0.01 0.13
EWR-TBL -0.01 16.52 -16.52 1.30 16.23 -14.93 0.02 17.21 -17.19
0.50 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.04 0.50 0.00 0.01
0.46 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.00 0.03 0.48 0.00 0.01
EWR-INF 2.58 15.38 -12.80 4.84 13.63 -8.79 1.94 17.95 -16.00
0.29 0.00 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.10 0.33 0.00 0.01
0.29 0.00 0.03 0.32 0.02 0.08 0.31 0.00 0.01
TBL-INF 2.54 -1.16 3.70 3.50 -2.66 6.16 1.89 0.79 1.10
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
T/Republicans 863/407 431/179 431/239
¯ R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
40Table II: Summary Statistics
The table reports means and standard deviations of all variables used in this study. Sum-
mary statistics are reported for both the quarterly and annual sample. All returns and
consumption growth are computed in logarithmic form and are reported in annualized per-
centage points.
Annual: 1961 - 1998
Full Sample Democratic Republican
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Financial Variables
VWR-TBL 5.98 15.55 9.74 12.13 2.58 17.71
EWR-TBL 8.64 23.58 15.99 17.64 2.02 26.59
DEC1-TBL 10.57 26.15 17.40 20.17 4.42 29.72
DEC2-TBL 8.64 24.06 14.97 17.76 2.94 2.78
DEC3-TBL 7.96 22.59 13.93 16.76 2.60 26.04
DEC4-TBL 8.40 21.56 14.31 17.23 3.08 24.02
DEC5-TBL 7.17 19.78 11.56 15.32 3.22 22.74
DEC6-TBL 7.40 18.89 10.74 14.43 4.40 22.11
DEC7-TBL 6.62 18.27 9.73 13.08 3.84 21.89
DEC8-TBL 7.12 16.47 10.23 12.77 4.34 19.10
DEC9-TBL 6.14 15.44 8.99 11.35 3.57 18.29
DEC10-TBL 5.47 14.99 8.29 13.19 2.93 16.35
Consumption Variables
∆ct 2.00 1.81 2.04 1.76 1.98 1.90
∆lt 9.0 9.58 12.27 8.1 5.96 10.05
Political Variables
Rept 67.89 21.81 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Table V: Luxury and Per Capita Consumption Across Presidential and Business
Cycles
This table examines the relationship between fundamentals, (∆lt+1;∆ct+1), the presidential cycle,
Rept, and the business cycle, contt+1 between 1961-1998. Each column of the table reports the results
of the regression ft+1 = °0+°1Rept+°1contt+1+"t+1, where ft+1 is either per capita consumption
growth (∆ct+1) or luxury consumption growth (∆lt+1). P-values are reported in parentheses and
the R2 is reported along the bottom row of the table.
∆lt+1 ∆ct+1
Rept ¡6:31 ¡3:61 ¡0:05 0:43




2 11.10% 34.42% 0.02% 20.91%
44Table VI: Expectations and the Presidential Cycle
This table reports the results from the following regression, Et;t+1 = a + bRept + ´t, where Et;t+1
represents the median expectation (forecast) of real stock returns, real GDP or the change in un-
employment between the end of year t and the end of year t + 1. As discussed in the text, in the
case of stock return forecasts, we use the implied real return over the last six months of the year.
All expectations data are expressed in annual percentage terms. The ﬁrst column reports the point
estimate, b b, the second column reports the p-value and the third column reports the R2 of the
regression.
b b p ¡ value R
2
Excess Returns 0:84 0:25 4:0
Real GDP Growth -0.14 0:82 0:14
∆ Unemployment -0.04 0:84 0:11
45Table VII: The Depression, Military Conﬂict and the Presidential Puzzle
This table reports the mean diﬀerence in excess returns on the value (∆(V WR ¡ TBL)) and equally-
weighted (∆(EWR ¡ TBL)) portfolios as well as the contraction index (∆cont), luxury consump-
tion (∆(∆l)) and per capita consumption growth (∆(∆c)). The diﬀerence in sample means are
presented over two periods, 1929-1998 and 1961-1998. For each period we consider the full sam-
ple period as well as a restricted sample. The restricted sample excludes the major Depression
years (1929-1935), World War II (1941-1945), the Korean Conﬂict (1950-1953), the Vietnam War
(1965-1975) and the Gulf War (1990-1991). All numbers are reported in annual terms
1929-1998 1961-1998
Full Sample Restricted Sample Full Sample Restricted Sample
Excess Returns
∆(V WR ¡ TBL) 9.93 -0.10 6.73 3.49
∆(EWR ¡ TBL) 15.67 0.11 13.97 5.29
Fundamentals
∆cont -0.80 -0.21 -0.63 -0.24
∆(∆l) – – 6.00 1.20
∆(∆c) – – 0.02 -0.88
46Figure I:
This ﬁgure plots real per capita (PCE) consumption, ∆ct, and Tiﬀany’s sales, ∆lt, growth
series over the sample period. The shaded regions reﬂect NBER recessionary periods. Any
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